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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
V.

RICHARD KAINOUA BORJA,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

NO. 47326-2019
BONNER COUNTY NO. CR09-18-4227

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Richard Kainoua Borja pied guilty to one count of felon in possession of a firearm. The
district court imposed a unified sentence of four years, with two years fixed, and retained
jurisdiction. The district court then relinquished jurisdiction a short time later. Mr. Borja appeals,
asserting the district court abused its discretion when it failed to initially place him on probation,
and again when it relinquished jurisdiction.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
In early 2018, detectives from the Bonner County Sherriff s Office received a report that
Mr. Borja had been involved in a domestic violence situation. (R., p.12.) After investigating
those reports, Mr. Borja was charged with two counts of aggravated assault, both with deadly
weapon enhancements, and two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm. (R., pp.1922.) A preliminary hearing was held and Mr. Borja was then bound over to district court on all
counts. (R., pp.47-49.) The State then filed an Information. (R., pp.54-56.)
Three months later, pursuant to plea negotiations with the State, Mr. Borja agreed to
plead guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm; in exchange, the State
agreed to drop the other counts and enhancements, and not to exceed the sentence recommended
in the presentence investigation report. (R., pp.86, 90.) At the sentencing hearing, the State
moved for dismissal of the other charges and enhancements, and recommended a unified
sentence of five years, with two years fixed, and for the court to retain jurisdiction. (Tr., p.9,
Ls.19-23.) Mr. Borja's attorney asked that he be given probation. (Tr., p.15, Ls.6-9.) The court
then imposed a sentence of four years, with two years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (Tr., p.17,
Ls.2-6; R., pp.112-14.) 1
Shortly after beginning the retained jurisdiction program, a rider review hearing was held.
(Tr., pp.23-33.) After reviewing an incident report from an altercation that occurred between
Mr. Borja and another inmate, the court relinquished jurisdiction. (Tr., p.32, Ls.8-14; R., pp.13639.)
Mr. Borja timely appealed from the order relinquishing jurisdiction. (R., pp.140-41.)
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Mr. Borja filed a motion under Rule 35 for a reduction of his sentence. (R., p.123.) However,
he did not include any new information with that motion. See State v. Huffman, 144, Idaho 201,
203 (2007). Accordingly, he does not appeal the court's denial of that motion. (R., p.125.)
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ISSUES
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it refused to place Mr. Borja on probation
following his plea of guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction instead of
placing Mr. Borja on probation?

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Not Placing Mr. Borja On Probation Following His
Plea Of Guilty To Being A Felon In Possession Of A Firearm

A.

Introduction
Mr. Borja asserts the district court abused its discretion by not placing him on probation.

Specifically, he asserts that the district court failed to exercise reason by not adequately weighing
mitigating factors that should have led the court to place him on probation.

B.

Standards Of Review
There are "four objectives of criminal punishment:

(1) protection of society, (2)

deterrence of the individual and the public generally, (3) possibility of rehabilitation, and (4)
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing." State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982)
(citing State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384 (1978)). Even so, "the primary consideration is the good
order and protection of society, [and a]ll other factors must be subservient to that end." Id.
(internal quotation marks and citations removed).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "' [w ]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing
the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho
573 (1979)).
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When this Court reviews an alleged abuse of discretion by a trial court the
sequence of inquiry requires consideration of four essentials. Whether the trial
court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the
outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by
the exercise of reason.
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018) (emphasis in original).
In this case, Mr. Borja contends the district court abused its discretion by failing to
exercise reason in its ultimate sentencing decision. "[R]easonableness is a fundamental
requirement." State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90 (1982). "'[R]easonableness' implies that a term of
confinement should be tailored to the purposes for which the sentence is imposed." Toohill, 103
Idaho at 568.

C.

Mr. Borja's Rehabilitative Efforts Before Sentencing, Coupled With Multiple Other
Mitigating Factors, Warranted An Opportunity For Probation
Courts are required to consider mitigating evidence in favor of the defendant. See State v.

Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002) (noting that when reviewing a sentence, Idaho's appellate
courts will "review the record on appeal, having due regard for the nature of the offense, the
character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest") (emphasis added); State v.
Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726 (2007) (same). Some of the mitigating factors courts should consider
before sentencing include a defendant's abusive childhood, amenability to treatment, mental
health issues, employability, and willingness or need to support a family. Mr. Borja asserts that
had the district court properly weighed all of the mitigating evidence in the record, it should have
placed him on probation.
Courts are encouraged to show leniency to defendants who have grown up in abusive or
broken homes. See, e.g., State v. Gonzales, 123 Idaho 92, 93-94 (Ct. App. 1993) (highlighting
mitigating factors that included the defendant had dropped out of high school, had been
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"subjected to an abusive childhood, living in numerous broken homes," and "was introduced to
drugs and alcohol at a very young age"); State v. Williams, 135 Idaho 618, 620 (Ct. App. 2001)
(discussing the defendant's "extremely troubled" and "dreadful childhood steeped in drug abuse,
criminality and violence"). Mr. Borja's childhood was not peaceful or idyllic by any measure. He
told the presentence investigator, "I was raised by my grandmother. My mother was an alcoholic
drug addict and a prostitute and was not able to care for me and my siblings." (PSI, p.28.) "He
indicated that both parents and siblings have struggled with addiction related issues." (PSI, p.4.)
Mr. Borja also relayed that "his parents were not married at the time of his birth and he does not
know his father." (PSI, p.3.) When he was eighteen, he and his girlfriend were "forced to marry
for cultural reasons" and later divorced. (PSI, pp.28, 30.) Mr. Borja did not graduate from high
school [and] fell into drugs." (PSI, p.28.) He "started smoking marijuana when he was
[and] was smoking [it] daily by the
the

." (PSI, p.5.) He also "began drinking alcohol at

." (PSI, p.5.) Nevertheless, Mr. Borja asserts the district court did not give this

mitigating evidence its proper weight.
Likewise, a defendant who is willing to undergo treatment should be shown leniency.

See, e.g., State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982) (reducing indeterminate portion of
sentence for robbery based on, inter alia, voluntary drug addiction rehabilitation); State v. Coffin,
146 Idaho 166, 171 (Ct. App. 2008) (mitigating circumstances included the defendant's
"willingness to seek treatment for an alcohol problem"). Mr. Borja was actively working on drug
addiction treatment before his incarceration. "In April 2018, Mr. Borja participated in outpatient
treatment at Alliance Family Services." (PSI, p.33.) "The GAIN assessment recommended Level
1.0 Outpatient treatment and referral for a mental health evaluation." (PSI, p.36.) His attorney
relayed at sentencing how Mr. Borja was clean "for the first time in a long time" because he
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wanted to be reunified with his children. (Tr., p.14, Ls.15-18.) He was working with Child
Protective Services on a reunification plan that included weekly urinalysis tests, all of which he
passed. (Tr., p.11, Ls.2-7.) He was pro actively involved in out-patient treatment as recommended
by the GAIN evaluator "and doing well." (Tr., p.11, Ls.2-7.)
If a defendant has mental illness or mental health problems, that should also be

considered as a mitigating factor. State v. Odiaga, 125 Idaho 384, 391 (1994) ("Idaho Code
§ 19-2523, which requires that the trial court consider the defendant's mental illness as a
sentencing factor, was an integral part of the legislature's repeal of mental condition as a
defense."). At various times throughout this case, Mr. Borja' s mental health and intellectual
limitations were discussed as a possible issue. The presentence investigator reported that
"Mr. Borja noted he has difficulty spelling, reading, and writing. His sister, Bella, assisted him in
completing the presentence questionnaire." (PSI, p.31.) During the domestic violence evaluation,
Mr. Borja "indicated that Depression, Bipolar and ADD/ADHD run on his maternal side of the
family." (PSI, p.4.) "Mr. Borja described his mental health as 'stable-ish' [and] noted he was
prescribed 'depression pills, anxiety pills' when he was incarcerated in the Bonner County Jail in
January 2019." (PSI, p.32.) He also indicated on the guilty plea advisory form that he had been
diagnosed with depression. (R., pp.88-89.) Mr. Borja also reported experiencing problems at
school due to his mental health, relating that he "received special education for having a
diagnosis of ADHD." (PSI, p.31.) "He reported that he took specialized classes in school once he
started attending classes. He indicated that he recalls that he started reading better when he was
in the 5th grade." (PSI, p.4.) All of this mitigating evidence should have been given greater
weight in favor of Mr. Borja being placed on probation.
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A defendant working to provide for his family is another factor courts should consider in
mitigation. See, e.g., State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982) (reducing the sentence of a
defendant, in part, because he "was working and helping to support his children at the time of the
conviction"); State v. Baiz, 120 Idaho 292, 293 (Ct. App. 1991) (treating the fact that the
defendant "was a reliable and hard worker when employed" as mitigating, but nevertheless
affirming his sentences). At sentencing, Mr. Borja's attorney reported he was "working full time
at Clyde's Towing." (Tr., p.11, Ls.10-11.) Mr. Borja's employer told the presentence investigator
that "he shows up every day and [that] he's doing fine." (PSI, p.31.) Mr. Borja also "expressed
an interest in obtaining his GED in the future." (PSI, p.4.) Mr. Borja was "trying to be reunified
with his [two young] children" and was doing all of this in an effort to show he could support
them. (Tr., p.14, Ls.15-18.)
Mr. Borja asserts that had the district court properly weighed all of the mitigating
evidence in the record, it should have led to him being placed on probation instead of being sent
to prison.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Relinquishing Jurisdiction Instead Of Placing
Mr. Borja On Probation

A.

Introduction
Mr. Borja asserts the district court abused its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction

instead of placing him on probation.

B.

Standard Of Review
"The decision to place a defendant on probation or whether, instead, to relinquish

jurisdiction over the defendant is a matter within the sound discretion of the district court and
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will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion." State v. Reed, 163 Idaho
681, 684 (Ct. App. 2018)). An alleged abuse of discretion will be reviewed for the four factors
previously cited. See Lunneborg, 163 Idaho at 863. "A court's decision to relinquish jurisdiction
will not be deemed an abuse of discretion if the trial court has sufficient information to determine
that a suspended sentence and probation would be inappropriate." State v. Hansen, 154 Idaho
882, 889 (Ct. App. 2013).

C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Relinquishing Jurisdiction Instead Of
Placing Mr. Borja On Probation
Mr. Borja asserts the district court abused its discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction and

not placing him on probation. Specifically, he asserts the district court failed to exercise reason
in relinquishing jurisdiction given the failure of the Department of Correction to follow
previously issued separation orders.
Shortly after Mr. Borja was placed in the retained jurisdiction program, he was involved
m an altercation with another inmate. (See Supp.R., p.2.) 2 The other individual had some
relationship to Mr. Borja's charges, and a separation order had been in place due to that
relationship. (See Tr., p.28, Ls.9-17.) Mr. Borja told the court the altercation began when the
other individual "came up to [him] and threatened [him]." (Tr., p.28, L.25.) This happened
despite Mr. Borja informing the Department of Correction when he began the retained
jurisdiction program that a separation order needed to be placed between them. (Tr., p.28, Ls.1517.) Mr. Borja does not dispute his role in the incident, and told the district court, "I am truly,
unbelievably sorry for doing what I did, for my actions. I was foolish for letting him get to me."
(Tr., p.28, Ls.18-20.)

2

The Supplemental Record file will be cited to as Supp.R.
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Mr. Borja asserts the district court abused its discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction
because he could have been placed in another institution and allowed to complete the retained
jurisdiction programming away from the other individual. "Confinement in any of the State's
institutions is within the normal limits or range of custody which the conviction has authorized
the State to impose." Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976). Prior to the incident, his
attorney reported that Mr. Borja had been showing signs of success in the program, and "seemed
motivated to complete [the] G.E.D. program." (Tr., p.30, Ls.20-24.) Mr. Borja's attorney also
told the court that "there is a lot that [Mr. Borja] could benefit from by being on the retained
jurisdiction." (Tr., p.31, Ls.2-3.) But even with the evidence of both Mr. Borja's initial success,
and the Department of Correction's failure to enforce or impose a separation order, the district
court relinquished jurisdiction. Mr. Borja asserts the district court did not reach that decision by
an exercise of reason and thus abused its discretion.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Borja respectfully requests that this Court remand his case with instructions that he
be placed on probation.
DATED this 11 th day of June, 2020.
/s/ R. Jonathan Shirts
R. JONATHAN SHIRTS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 11 th day of June, 2020, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
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Administrative Assistant
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